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Abstract
Many of today’s public policies aimed directly or indirectly at regulating the behaviors 
of individuals and organizations provide for the implementation of a certain type of 
instrument which can be qualified as a label. They share some features with what the 
literature tends to identify as proper standards (e.g., they aim at defining the best prac-
tices, they may represent – at least – a symbolic resource for those who adopt them), but 
they also have some peculiarities, which we will present here. In this paper, we propose 
to analyze the characteristics and dynamics underpinning this mode of governance as 
part of a study of two particular public policy domains chosen for their complementar-
ity as well as their contrasts: the fight against obesity, and sustainable consumption. In 
both of these fields, labels have become a preferred mode of governance – and even, we 
might say, a kind of standard. Based on Foucault (2004), we emphasize the fact that the 
logics of distinction, which regulate utilities and sanctions in a particular social field, 
are instrumentalized by public policy as an incentive to the actors to deliberately take 
action whose value is endorsed by a label. Hence, the aim and outcome of this mode of 
governance are not the uniformity of a field, but the ongoing creation of increasingly 
demanding labels that only some of the participants can hope to obtain.
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Governance by Labels
Introduction
Many of today’s public policies aimed directly or indirectly at regulating the behaviors 
of individuals and organizations provide for the implementation of a certain type of 
instrument which can be qualified as a label. They share some features with what the lit-
erature tends to identify as proper standards: they aim at defining the best practices and, 
more broadly, at regulating a sector or a social field (Brunsson/Jacobsson 2000; Tim-
mermans/Epstein 2010); they are non-binding instruments and rely on voluntary ad-
herence from actors or organizations (Brunsson 1999); they may represent – at least  – a 
symbolic resource for those who adopt them (Segrestin 1997; Ahrne/Brunsson/Garsten 
2000). However, labels also have some peculiarities. One major peculiarity which we 
will develop in this paper is the following: whereas standardization aims at harmoniz-
ing and unifying a social field in a direct manner (Bowker/Leigh Star 1999; Timmer-
mans/Epstein 2010), the label as an instrument aims at playing on actors’ willingness 
to distinguish themselves from other actors in the same competitive field in order to 
indirectly modify their behaviors in a definite – but loose – direction.
In this paper, we propose to analyze the characteristics and dynamics underpinning this 
mode of governance as part of a study of two particular public policy domains chosen 
for their complementarity as well as their contrasts (see below): the fight against obesity, 
and sustainable consumption. In both of these fields, labels have become a preferred 
mode of governance and even, we might say, a kind of standard. Labels can be granted, 
by public authorities or agencies that have become legitimate in the field, to items as 
diverse as mass consumer goods (e.g., eco-labels, healthy food products), public events 
(e.g., actions labeled in the framework of a “sustainable development week” or a “taste 
week”), public health actions or events, or towns (e.g., with regard to obesity and public 
health: “EPODE” towns and PNNS towns in France (Bergeron/Castel/Nouguez 2011).
Regarding the field of the fight against obesity, one is struck by the intensive re-
course to labels. Consider the recent “Let’s Move!” campaign in the United States 
(www.letsmove.gov). In France, the Ministry of Health and the agency in charge of 
health education and promotion, INPES, directly promote the “WHO (World Health 
Organization) City” label and the “PNNS (Programme National Nutrition Santé) City” 
label (Direction Générale de la Santé or DGS). The French Ministry of Health as well as 
the European Union also grant some for-profit-firms the privilege of using their names. 
The PNNS, a French government policy in the same area, has itself become a label, used 
to endorse what it considers “good actions.” Public relations and prevention operations 
designed to induce consumers to turn toward trusted (label-bearing) products need 
to be “labelized” themselves. This way of saturating the field with labels is perhaps an 
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indicator that major reshuffling is underway – an indicator, then, of intense uncertainty 
about the quality of the (new) actors investing the field and the (new) services and 
products circulating in it.
The policy domain of sustainable development also provides some good examples of 
the proliferation of labeling activities. The French Ministry of Environment or its tech-
nical agency, the Agency for the Environment (ADEME) are contributing to label prod-
ucts, but organizations such as companies and even events are also doing so in order to 
signal their effort towards lowering their impact on the environment. In addition to the 
eco-labeling public policy – which is designed as an information signal to consumers – 
the government also organizes a week dedicated to sustainable development activities. 
Cities or organizations from civil society may propose public events that can be selected 
as “events for the week of sustainable development” as long as they are dedicated to a 
broad audience and contribute to the education of citizens. Such events benefit from 
the publicity provided by the government and may use the logo of the Ministry on 
their different advertisements. The Agency for the Environment created a program for 
companies which endorsed activities benefitting the environment (such as reducing 
waste, increasing recycling, and developing eco-design practices) that allows them to be 
labeled by the Agency and use the logo of ADEME on their public documentation or 
advertising policies.
In this paper, we propose to focus on one program from each of these public policy 
domains: a program preventing child obesity, and the French eco-labeling program. 
However, we will also offer insights into other significant initiatives in both fields. Our 
analysis will proceed in three steps. The first section presents our research methods. The 
second describes both programs of labeling and the mechanisms on which they rest. 
The third and last section concludes by identifying some characteristics of this mode of 
governance and analyzing what this mode reveals about the broad transformations of 
public policies and, more particularly, about the (welfare) state.
Methods
A research program
This paper is part of a larger research program1 aimed at analyzing the contemporary 
mode of government of consumer behavior. This mode of government is based on pub-
lic policy interventions as well as on market mechanisms. In line with some Foucauld-
1 Since 2009, this program, entitled “Gouverner les conduites des consommateurs: la politique de 
consommation durable et la lutte contre l’obésité,” has been under the supervision of Sophie 
Dubuisson-Quellier (CSO) and has been funded by the French National Research Agency.
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ian analyses about governmentality (Miller/Rose 2008), especially in the field of envi-
ronmental policies (Rumpala 2009) or public health (Bunton/Nettleton/Burrows  1995; 
Tesh 1988; Armstrong 1995; Petersen/Bunton 1997; Thanem 2009), the starting point 
of this program is the observation that, in most Western countries, many different pub-
lic interventions aim at enhancing individual autonomy (under control) in order to 
govern citizens’ behavior and choices. These interventions are expected to contribute 
to governing individual behaviors, due to their anticipated negative collective conse-
quences, in a context where autonomy is required.
Policies against obesity and policies favoring sustainable consumption are two cases 
that illustrate such a trend. Even if the two fields were chosen because they also seem 
to differ from each other in some aspects (and, indeed, we did observe some empirical 
differences),  the criterion for both choices was a specific kind of policy instrument and 
tool that we observed and which was conceived of as a central regulating device in both 
fields: labels.
From a theoretical point of view, we combined an organizational perspective and eco-
nomic sociology with a political sociology approach to public policy instruments (or 
tools) in accounting for processes of public policy change (Lascoumes/Le Galès 2007; 
Hood 1986). On the one hand, we studied forms of cooperation and competition between 
public, private, and associative actors in the process of government. On the other, we tried 
to account for and specify the diversity of instruments (market instruments, communica-
tion, and education devices or contracts), which are developed by all these actors.
EPODE: A private program to fight a public problem
Among the wide range of preventive and curative actions that have been developed 
to combat excess weight and obesity, providing information and education on indi-
viduals’ – and particularly children’s – health is now considered essential. In France, 
health education campaigns are run by all sorts of national and local prevention actors: 
the Institut National de Prévention et d’Education pour la Santé (hereafter INPES); 
département-level health promotion organizations; specialized, private-status not-for-
profit associations as defined by France’s Law of 1901; département-level services for 
the protection of pregnant women, new mothers, and children; Ministry of Education 
services; municipal health and hygiene services; national public health insurance ser-
vices; complementary health insurance organizations, etc. But one particular preven-
tion program caught and held our interest: “Ensemble Prévenons l’Obésité des Enfants” 
(“Together let’s prevent obesity in children”), hereafter called EPODE. Designed and 
run by professionals in the fields of nutrition, management, and marketing who work 
through a private social marketing agency, and funded by contributions from towns 
and cities enrolled in the program as well as by subsidies from partner companies, some 
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of which belong to the food and mass marketing industries, EPODE has managed to 
acquire a key position in shaping and developing arrangements for detecting and pre-
venting child obesity. Its success can be summed up in a few figures. From 2004 to 2011, 
the number of French cities enrolled rose from 10 to 226, including Paris and Lille. 
Several other countries and regions of the world (Australia, Mexico, Belgium, Spain, 
and Greece) have also taken up the experiment, enabling program promoters to claim 
that no less than four million people are concerned. Moreover, the European Commis-
sion – specifically, the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Affairs or General 
Directorate Health and Consumer – was quickly won over by the experiment and has 
hired EPODE to develop good practices guidelines to be used in local obesity preven-
tion policy throughout the EU, the idea being for it to serve as a cognitive and norma-
tive basis for implementing similar policies in all European Union cities (www.epode-
european-network.com). Last but not least, it has come to be recognized as a potentially 
influential initiative by the Obama Task Force against obesity “Let’s Move!” Thus, all in 
all, the program has acquired a kind of transnational legitimacy.
Since our purpose was to understand the mechanisms through which this private op-
erator assumed importance and influence in the public health arena, it was important 
to collect and understand actors’ individual, subjective perceptions of the program and 
its ways of proceeding, and to discover the structure of those actors’ informal relation-
ships. This is why, in addition to examining materials developed and disseminated by 
the program, types of actions carried out, and official documents and reports, we chose 
to conduct a number of in-depth, semi-directive interviews. Systematic, reiterated com-
parison of actors’ viewpoints, duly related to the more factual data we have also ana-
lyzed, enable us to identify and circumscribe the regularity of certain action dynamics 
and approaches and thus to go beyond a mere accumulation of idiosyncratic opinions 
(Crozier/Friedberg 1980).
Given the program structure, we chose to focus the investigation at two interdependent 
levels: national and local. At the national level, the point was both to understand the 
strategy2 of the program promoters and their interrelationships as well as their relation-
ships with their main partners and other institutions in the field. We therefore ques-
tioned managers in charge of the not-for-profit association and the private business 
running the program, some of the scientists with whom those managers work within 
the framework of the program, industry representatives involved in funding the pro-
gram, and actors involved in the Plan National Nutrition Santé (PNNS) at the DGS and 
INPES. At the local level, we chose only cities that had been enrolled in the program 
for at least a year so that we could observe how the program was being implemented. 
We selected four towns which were different enough that we could reasonably hope 
that a comparison would be productive: three towns with high rates of excess weight 
2 In the broad sense that Crozier and Friedberg (1980) give the term: i.e., reconstructed by the 
researcher and not necessarily implying actor awareness.
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and obesity in children and one with low rates. The idea here was to study whether lo-
cal dynamics for implementing the program differed by the degree of significance that 
the problem seemed to have. Furthermore, two of the towns with high levels of excess 
weight and obesity are small towns; the other is medium-sized – the point being to 
measure whether the amount of municipal resources influenced the nature of program 
implementation. For each town studied, we questioned many of the actors directly or 
indirectly involved in the program, both those participating in program enactment and 
those who did not wish to participate in it – despite program members’ uniform desire 
to have them do so. We tried to reconstruct the system of informal relationships found 
between these local-level actors as well as relationships between local officials and na-
tional program coordinators. In each of these locales, we interviewed elected town of-
ficials and town administrative workers, doctors and nurses, community organization 
actors, teachers, and representatives of the state services operating at the regional level 
as well as representatives of regional health and social affairs bureaus (DRASS) and 
regional public health authorities (GRSP). In each locale, between 30 and 50 interviews 
were conducted making a total of 123 interviews (Bergeron et al. 2011).
The French policy on sustainable consumption
The notion of sustainable consumption was considered, at the World Summits, to be 
at the core of sustainable development issues. During the Rio Conference of 1992, sus-
tainable consumption was identified as a crucial solution to decrease human pressure 
on the environment. The Johannesburg World Summit of 2002 led to several recom-
mendations regarding national sustainable production and consumption policies. Like 
many other Western countries, in 2003, France developed a national policy on sustain-
able development which specifically mentioned sustainable consumption as one of its 
main priorities. But in fact, this policy really developed in the context of the presiden-
tial election of 2007, when many social movements were very critical about the place 
of consumption in economic development (Dubuisson-Quellier et al. 2011). During 
the campaign, several environmental NGOs forced the different candidates to place 
environmental issues on their electoral programs by asking them to present their main 
proposals during a conference which they organized and which the media echoed. The 
newly-elected president, Nicolas Sarkozy, whose proposals were rated badly by the 
NGOs, decided to take up some of the NGOs’ recommendations, convinced that the 
great notoriety which environmental issues had acquired within public opinion would 
open up interesting political opportunities for him. He created a large ministry for the 
environment which was placed first in the government hierarchy and initiated a con-
ference (hereafter called Grenelle de l’environnement) on environmental issues which 
created, in return, large political opportunities for environmental NGOs to diffuse their 
ideas and proposals into governmental action. Two of the main instruments that were 
developed for sustainable consumption policies – a tax instrument and a project of 
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environmental-impact labeling – emerged from the Grenelle de l’environnement. A tax 
instrument called bonus-malus was designed to create economic incentives for consum-
ers to buy low-carbon emission cars. The idea is to tax cars with poor environmental 
performances and, conversely, to reward consumers who buy cars with good environ-
mental performances by offering them a tax rebate. A project of environmental-impact 
labeling was designed based on two pillars. A legislative pillar inscribed into law the 
right for consumers to be provided with information on the environmental impacts of 
all mass-consumption products. Such information should be based on a multi-criteria 
approach to the impacts’ assessment (carbon emissions should not be the only impact 
assessed) and on a life-cycle analysis (the impact assessment should also take the con-
sumption stage into consideration). The law plans that the environmental labeling stan-
dards should be determined by a large consultation including all stakeholders (firms, 
business associations, state, civil society). These two new instruments are associated 
with other existing instruments which have consequently been generalized and empha-
sized and which lie at the core of the argument: the eco-labeling policy and the use of 
contractual instruments with economic actors. 
The development of a French policy on eco-labeling started at the end of the 1980s, and 
its main aim was to stimulate companies by endorsing efforts to lower the environmen-
tal impacts of their products. The idea was to use the market as an arena for companies 
to signal those efforts and obtain economic rewards. As such, its purpose is to orient 
companies’ practices by transforming the environmental properties of products into 
strategic differentiation. The Ministry for the Environment manages the program of 
defining the criteria for attributing the label and also takes charge of the communica-
tion policy to educate consumers about the eco-label. The government was encour-
aged by the national success of labeling schemes such as the Blue Angel in Germany 
and the Nordic Swan in the Nordic countries, although the market shares for eco-label 
products are still small in France compared to these countries. Two eco-labels are avail-
able in France: the French eco-label, called NF-Environment, is a private brand which 
is managed both by the French Agency for the Environment and the French Agency 
(ADEME) for Standardization (AFNOR); companies may also use the European eco-
label. The European committee for the eco-label manages to avoid double eco-labeling 
by favoring eco-label projects for which a national eco-label does not already exist. The 
methodologies used for eco-label standard building furnished the matrix for the recent 
development of the environmental-impact labeling project mentioned earlier.
The other set of instruments stems from contractual arrangements between the state 
and economic actors which commit companies to making efforts to reduce their envi-
ronmental impacts (in waste management, transport, building, energy or eco-design). 
Several of these contracts have been signed, either with companies or with business 
associations. The state will organize press conferences to publicize the signature, but 
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it will also patronize some events that are related to the contract, or it may permit the 
logo or some of the campaign slogans developed by the Ministry for the Environment 
or ADEME to appear on some commercial documents.
In order to assess this sustainable consumption policy, we carried out a field study and 
gathered three types of data. The first type consists of all the documents and discourses 
produced by the two main actors involved in this policy: the department in charge of 
the policy at the Ministry of the Environment (hereafter CGDD) and ADEME. Both 
produced abundant documentation in the form of surveys and reports aimed at pro-
moting the main instruments of the policy, but also at evaluating their impacts and 
diffusing data on the environmental impacts of consumption and change in consump-
tion behaviors. The second type of data consists of interviews conducted with all the 
public actors in charge of this policy (n=28), which we complemented with interviews 
with firms, NGOs, and consultancy companies that were involved either in the design 
of policy instruments, consultation or partnerships for the promotion of sustainable 
consumption (n=20). The third type of data includes press articles and parliamentary 
debates relating to the subject of sustainable consumption.
Case studies
EPODE
We will show that the program’s power derives a great deal from its label, which has 
become a kind of flag for community organizations to rally round. While many EPODE 
activities are modeled on interventions and events that already existed at the national 
level, such as “taste week,” and although program promoters seek to develop their own 
new actions (above all, supervised activities and interventions in the classroom), many 
obesity prevention activities had initially been organized by not-for-profit associations, 
Ministry of Education employees (nurses, teachers and school cafeteria directors in par-
ticular), and child day-care centers. These activities may well have already been in place 
before the municipality contracted with EPODE. In fact, these groups and organiza-
tions agree to use the EPODE label primarily because they hope it will help them catch 
the attention of the local press and thus win greater recognition for their own actions 
and receive more support from the other institutions in exchange. Being included and 
integrated into the program thus constitutes a strategic resource similar to the one pro-
vided to companies by norms and standards: actors can promote actions they consider 
important more effectively if they refer to the EPODE program than if they mention 
only their own competence and skills:
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I’m telling you, we didn’t have to wait for EPODE to do EPODE ourselves. What’s good is that it 
gave us some resonance. In the end we realized that [what we were doing] was really part of the 
program: athletic games, getting the children to move. … What was new was that we got recog-
nition for what we were doing. We’re better known. It’s easier to get material when you’re better 
known. We’ve got a reading workshop. We were able to get money for books on diet, DVDs. It’s 
easier. (Activity leader of a noontime children’s play center) 
I’m going to run EPODE activities to get [our] association better known and show what we know 
how to do. Because there’s a big [negative] story about this neighborhood. It’s to show another 
image of the neighborhood, to give it value. (Leader of a children’s play activity association)
In this way, the EPODE label actually works to desingularize the EPODE project, situat-
ing it within a vaster – and more legitimate – collective. Because EPODE is able to bring 
together local initiatives and get them working around its own label, it represents an 
important resource for mayors who want to show how committed they are to serving 
their fellow citizens. In exchange, those mayors have played (and continue to play) a 
fundamental role in institutionalizing and diffusing the program.
The program has thus acquired legitimacy through its ability to bring together and ag-
gregate a network of actions and local initiatives around its label. But in order for that 
label to be judged effective and useful by local actors and for EPODE to continue to 
grow, it seemed necessary to its promoters to link the program to other national and 
European Union institutions and labels. The full set of logos for these support sources 
is displayed on official EPODE brochures. EPODE actors heavily stress the support 
their program has received from institutions as diverse as city and town governments 
(via city enrollment in the program, with those cities then immediately joining the 
“EPODE city club”), mayors (the “EPODE mayors’ club,” via the Association des Maires 
de France), the European Union (via the DG - Health and Consumer), the French state 
(via the Ministry of Health and Sport, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Food, 
Agriculture and Fishing, the state ministry for Urban Affairs and Renovation, and the 
PNNS), and “science” (via EPODE’s links to scientists working in the common research 
framework it has developed, as well as its ties to the Académie Nationale de Médecine, 
the Société Française de Pédiatrie, the Association Française de Pédiatrie Ambulatoire, 
and the scientific papers published in those organizations’ medical journals). We will 
thus stress the importance in the institutionalization process of winning the solidarity 
of these other labels and the support of united actors. The decisive contribution made 
to the institutionalization process by the institutional ties these entrepreneurs were 
able to develop patiently over time is clear: EPODE quickly found itself embedded in 
a vast fabric of institutions and supports, which its promoters were then able to closely 
identify with their own activity; institutions and supports that then, in crisscross fash-
ion, furthered the institutionalization of the EPODE program. The main objective of 
EPODE is to develop a network of actors and organizations (not-for-profit community 
organizations, schoolteachers, social workers, food retail shops, etc.), united behind the 
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same label that will convey the same kind of preventive messages to families and chil-
dren: in what can be identified as a kind of inverse panoptic, EPODE’s actors encircle 
individuals to get them change their deleterious behaviors.
At a national level, EPODE as a label has become one of the policy tools that the Ministry 
of Health uses to get local municipalities and actors involved in the fight against excess 
weight and obesity: each municipality that has successfully implemented an EPODE 
program is granted the PNNS’s public label, and the bearer of such a label is identified 
as an actor that has demonstrated a strong political commitment and deployed “mod-
ern and rational” policies. What is interesting is that the endeavors made by municipal 
actors – and in particular, mayors – in order to acquire the PNNS label are not driven 
by their willingness to conform to appropriate institutional norms, but on the contrary, 
are based on their attempts to signal to their environment that they are different, “more 
modern and rational” – in short, in exactly the same way that local community field ac-
tors seek to get their actions labeled by EPODE in order to distinguish themselves from 
other traditional public health actors.
Implementing policy tools (like labels) that play with the very social dynamics and log-
ics of actors whose behaviors one wants to transform is not limited to municipal actors. 
It occurs in corporations and firms as well. Actually, the French Ministry of Health has 
developed what it calls the Chartes d’engagement volontaire (Voluntary charters), whose 
basic principle is the following: the Minster agrees to sign a charter with a (food) indus-
try (or the other way round!), in which the firm commits itself to achieving some mu-
tually agreed-up, health-beneficial objectives – such as the attainment of a certain level 
of salt, sugar, fat, etc. in the composition of their products by the year X. In exchange, 
the firm is entitled, although under quite strict conditions, to use the logotype and 
the associated signature of the Charter in its communication policy. EU Directorate 
General Health and Consumer does not depart from this trend: it has its own “obesity 
and overweight platform,” both a tool and a policy arena dedicated to negotiating and 
boosting food industries’ “healthy commitments,” whose counterpart is the permission 
for engaged firms to use the Health and Consumer General Directorate’s label in their 
communication and promotion strategies (again, under some quite restrictive condi-
tions). Finally, be it at the municipal, national, or European level, the rationale behind 
this particular form of policy instruments remains the same: to play on the desire of 
actors to distinguish themselves from their peers in the (political, symbolic, social, or 
economic) competition that they are engaged in, in order to make them change their 
behaviors and practices.
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Eco-labeling
Echoing some of the mechanisms at play in the case of EPODE and the voluntary char-
ters presented earlier, some of the instruments used in the sustainable consumption 
policy also play on distinction and the isomorphic mechanisms at stake on markets. 
The eco-label is a standard that defines the requirements a product should fulfil in or-
der to use the logo of the French eco-label (NF-Environnement) on its packaging. The 
instrument was designed as a solution for economic actors to create value from their 
efforts toward increasing their environmental performance by benefiting from a kind 
of “state certification.” The state organizes the conditions through which companies can 
benefit from strategic differentiation by allowing only a few of the products within an 
industry to use the eco-label.
The specifications of the eco-label instrument are threefold. The first specification is re-
lated to the principles that underpin the policy. The label must be selective: this means 
that a real differentiation should operate on the market, and the level of requirements 
included in the standard should result in a dramatic selection within the supply. The 
idea is that the requirements should be set in such a way that only 20 percent of the 
products from this category on the market can fulfill them: if this proportion is higher, 
it means that the standard is not selective enough. The idea, which was at the core of the 
development of this public policy instrument, is to reward (through the market) only 
strong efforts regarding environmental performance.
Oh yes, I fought for this. The eco-label must be selective. But this was not so easy. Business asso-
ciations were mad about that. They were used for standards, for consultation at AFNOR, which 
leads generally to a standard with which everybody can comply. But we wanted to be selective … 
elitist, yes. (Person in charge of the promotion of eco-labels, Ministry of the Environment)
Another requirement of the eco-label is the plurality of criteria on which the standard 
should be based. The environmental impacts of the product are to be assessed through 
several (generally three) types of impacts – not only the carbon footprint of the 
product – and the methodology for assessment should involve life-cycle analysis (LCA) 
in order to take into consideration all the different steps in the life of the product, from 
the extraction of raw materials to the recycling of the product. These very demanding 
specifications are also aimed at restricting the number and type of products, which 
may obtain the eco-label, since these products must have a low impact based on several 
criteria and during their whole lifetime, from cradle to grave. In this way, public actors 
intend for the eco-labeling strategy to represent a first move, which will help companies 
engage in the environmental-impact labeling mentioned earlier. 
The second specification concerns the process of constructing the standard. Any com-
pany may apply to the “label committee” created for this selection task by presenting an 
eco-standardization project for a specific category of existing consumer or professional 
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products (shampoo, coffee makers, garbage bags, paints, etc.). The project includes a 
market survey which is aimed at providing an evidence-based demonstration of the 
product’s market potential (showing that the eco-labeled supply will meet with strong 
demand), a presentation of the company’s environmental strategy, a demonstration of 
the capacity of the standard to distinguish eco-friendly products on the market, and 
some proposals about the criteria that should be used for the standard. The committee, 
which consists of three types of stakeholders (manufacturers and retailers, consumer 
advocates, and government and public agencies), evaluates the proposal, and both the 
agency for standardization and the agency for the environment assess its technical fea-
sibility, define the criteria and coordinate a working group in which the business asso-
ciation can participate. Once the standard is published, an independent certifying com-
pany monitors the use of eco-label market signals by companies pretending to comply 
with the standard. 
The third feature concerns the mechanisms on which the instrument intends to play: 
competition and mimetic dynamics. The standard only remains in place for a short 
period and is re-evaluated every three years. This mechanism is aimed at ensuring that 
companies make constant progress on their environmental product policies. Once a 
standard is published, as mentioned, it allows for only 20 percent of the supply in the 
product category to be distinguished; but within a few years, more and more products 
may comply with the standard, increasing the market share of eco-labeled products. 
By making the standard more demanding, the committee keeps the label very selective 
and obliges companies to improve their environmental performance. The eco-labeling 
policy is clearly based on mimetic isomorphic mechanisms, but also on competition 
mechanisms that create incentives for firms benefiting from differentiation through the 
eco-label to keep their strategic advantage in the market. Public action is based on the 
assumption that a company which invests in building the standard has a great interest 
in maintaining its differentiated status, while challenger companies will try to comply – 
either to benefit from the differentiation, or to make it disappear.
Yes, the standard must regularly be improved to take into consideration technological innova-
tions, or new raw materials that will be on the market, like bio plastics, or compostable poly-
mers, and so on … And also to stay … one has to keep in mind that we need to remain selec-
tive! … The eco-label cannot be given to … more than 20 percent of the products on the market. 
Everybody cannot be eco-labelized. Then, we need to revise the criteria upwards, otherwise it is 
too easy. Our goal is to pull up the market. (Person in charge of eco-labeling, ADEME)
Of course, such an instrument cannot be as efficient as regulatory instruments, which 
may be based on high requirements and enforce companies to comply with them. But 
the assumption made by public actors is that the label temporarily creates a competitive 
dynamic which may motivate innovators, who will then make efforts regarding their 
environmental performance and also stimulate challengers to imitate them. It creates 
incentives both for incumbent and challenger companies, and relies on the propen-
sity of companies to imitate each other (Fligstein 2001). The instrument presupposes a 
12 MaxPo Discussion Paper 14/2
strong involvement by the state to legitimate the label as a specific market device (Callon 
2007) that is asked to have a higher credibility than all other market devices, especially 
commercial brands. Companies – which predominantly remain reluctant to adopt an 
instrument they consider costly and insufficiently identified by consumers – have, for 
several years, been asking for a larger commitment by the state in the promotion of 
eco-labels. In 2010, for the first time, the Ministry paid for a TV advertising campaign. 
Its decision was less committed to the idea that such a campaign could be heard by 
consumers, considering its impossibility to compete with the financial resources of the 
private sector; much more, it was intended as a proof of its strong involvement towards 
companies. The ministry also provides companies, especially retailing companies, with 
different communication devices promoting the eco-label, which they may use in their 
prospectuses or directly on the shelves.
This idea of playing the market – namely, of relying on the propensity of companies to 
both differentiate from and imitate each other (Dubuisson-Quellier 2012) – is also at 
the core of the contracting instruments of the sustainable consumption policy. As men-
tioned earlier, several contracts have been signed by the state with companies or profes-
sional associations that have committed to increasing their environmental efforts in a 
specific aspect of their processes. For example, a retailer agreed to decrease its quantity 
of waste and develop eco-design processes for the products sold under its own brand 
name; a national sports association agreed to organize solutions for its practitioners to 
bring back used sports materials to clubs; a retailer agreed to replace all its supermar-
kets’ open cold stores with closed-window cold stores. These contracts are numerous, 
but they are developed with caution in order to bank only on companies or associations 
that are thought to have the capacity to stimulate their whole industry or profession.
What are we looking for? To make the whole industry progress. When we signed the convention 
with X, we considered X has the capacity to have a lever effect on the whole industry. If you take 
this convention, we helped them to implement their own diagnostic tool, we also participated 
in the jury to reward their best suppliers. This got large repercussions. For their suppliers, for 
the company, but also in the media, the professional journals echoed their initiatives, we also 
communicated about this operation, and even the suppliers who received awards for their ef-
forts benefited from this communication, so it’s not only the retailing sector that have been 
concerned but also all manufacturers of mass consumption products. (Person in charge of 
partnership, ADEME)
For companies, these contracts allow them to use some of the communication tools of 
the state and then benefit from the legitimacy of public actions. The media will show 
the Ministry’s presence in their facilities or stores; they may use some of the slogans of 
public campaigns on climate change and sustainable consumption policy, or even the 
logo of the public campaigns (more rarely, the logo of ADEME). This legitimacy, in the 
form of patronization by the state, is then used as a strategic differentiation device that 
leading companies in an industry are seeking. 
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Conclusion
The proper name EPODE (and those of other labels we have briefly mentioned above) 
and the French eco-label have thus become “labels” in Pierre François’s sense (François 
2011): an “empirical proposition” becomes a label – or an institution – when actors 
regularly turn to and use it as a pre-existing framework of experience that orients their 
judgment and action, particularly when they need to make choices in situations of un-
certainty. The EPODE label has an obvious normative dimension, since it prescribes 
what various actors (mayors, local actors, EU actors, etc.) should decide and do in a 
highly varied set of situations (transposability) and is regularly used by those actors as 
a means of recognizing and gaining recognition for the seriousness and professional-
ism of the actions carried out within its framework. In the case of the eco-label, the 
results are less simple, most probably because of the use of different words: for histori-
cal reasons, such as the NF-environment brand which public opinion considers to be 
a standard, and the European eco-label which public opinion does not connect to the 
state. But obviously, the state is seeking lever mechanisms that could come from the 
very competitive nature of the market – which leads to the propensity of economic ac-
tors to look for differentiation and distinction. 
The specific characteristics of a mode of governance by labels are evidenced in its ability 
to play on the social dynamics peculiar to certain social environments, and especially 
on the actors’ freedom and their wish to position themselves by distinguishing them-
selves in a particular competitive field, be it markets or worlds of reputation. The aim 
would be to orient them towards options that public policy actors – especially the state – 
consider to be collectively beneficial. The literature has clearly shown the unanticipat-
ed effects of processes of standardization (Brunsson/Jacobsson 2000; Brunsson 1999; 
Timmermans/Epstein 2010; Borraz 2007). Among these unanticipated effects, it has 
been shown that, paradoxically, standardization can be at the root of a diversification 
of the practices and organizations within a field, through local adaptation of standards 
during their implementation (Brunsson 2000; Timmermans/Berg 1997), and through 
the opportunities for strategic differentiation that they afford (Segrestin 1997; Castel/
Friedberg 2010; Castel 2009). In the case of labels, we show that this mode of gover-
nance plays precisely (and deliberately) on this ambivalence. It is hoped that a stan-
dardization of practices will result from an individual wish to stand out in a competitive 
market through the acquisition of labels. Based on Foucault (2004), we emphasize the 
fact that the logics of distinction which regulate utilities and sanctions in a particular 
social field are instrumentalized by public policy as an incentive to the actors to delib-
erately take action whose value is endorsed by a label. Hence, the aim and outcome of 
this mode of governance are not the uniformity of a field, but the ongoing creation of 
increasingly demanding labels that only some of the participants can hope to obtain. 
We would argue that whereas the cognitive model of standards is (partial) organization 
(Ahrne/Brunsson 2010), labels play more on (partial) market mechanisms.
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Governance by labels is singular and interesting insofar as it enables public actors – es-
pecially the state – to identify a policy orientation without the necessity of giving precise 
content to the practices identified as virtuous. It can (at least initially) leave it up to the 
actors concerned to define these practices themselves or to propose some of them. We 
can posit that the domains of the environment and public health, which are character-
ized by a strong indeterminacy of knowledge and the difficulty of identifying best prac-
tices, are particularly well-suited to the implementation of this mode of governance. But 
these are also fields in which aggressive regulatory policies could prove to be particularly 
costly, at least in the short term, in terms of competitiveness and employment.
Finally, the social dynamics that governance by labels is designed to activate resemble 
those of “security devices” in a Foucauldian sense: governance by labels acts on indi-
viduals’ autonomy. What is interesting in our case is that labels play on autonomy to 
produce heteronomy. That is why it does not seem to reflect a disengagement of the 
state in these areas as much as an increasingly broad investment, especially in individu-
als’ behaviors.
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